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INTRODUCTION
Section 522(b)(1)l of The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(Bankruptcy Act)2 permits a state to force a bankrupt domiciled
within its borders3 to rely on exemptions4 provided by state law.
With the enactment of Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section
427.170,- the Kentucky legislature imposed its own exemption
I 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate ... (1) property that is specified under sub-
section (d) of this section, unless the State law that is applicable to the
debtor under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so
authorize ....
2 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was enacted by Pub. L. 95-598, title I, §
101, Nov. 6, 1978, 93 Stat. 2549 (Codified as 11 U.S.C. (1978)) [hereinafter cited as
Bankruptcy Act with section references to U.S.C.]. See text accompanying notes 29-34
infra for purposes of Bankruptcy Act.
The debtor may invoke the exemption statute of the "place in which the debtor's
domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date of the filing
of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period than in any other place."
11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982).
4 The estate created with the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings "includes...
all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start. After the property comes
into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under ... 11 U.S.C. § 522,
and the court will have jurisdiction to determine what property may be exempted and
what remains as property of the estate." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5868.
1 Ky. REv. STAT. § 427.170 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1984)[hereinafter cited as
KRS] provides: "An individual debtor domiciled in this state is not authorized to exempt
from property of said debtor's estate the property specified under subsection (d) of
section 522 of The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 .. "
Two-thirds of the states have enacted similar statutes. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 33-1133(B) (Supp. 1983-84); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.20 (West Supp. 1984); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-13-100(b) (1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881(B)(a) (West Supp.
1984); S.D. CODnIED LAws AN. § 43-31-30 (1983); VA. CODE § 34-3.1 (1984); Wyo.
STAT. § 1-20-109 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
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scheme6 on Kentucky bankrupts. Consequently-with the excep-
tion of certain specific federal exemptions 7-Federal bankruptcy
courts in Kentucky are, at least initially,s required to test the
validity of an exemption claim under state law.9
In In re Worthington'0 the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Western District of Kentucky faced the question of
whether an Individual Retirement Account (IRA)" was exempt
under the applicable state exemption statute, KRS section
427.150(1)(b).. 2 In this case, the debtor had set up an IRA prior
to filing a voluntary petition 13 under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy
6 For exemptions allowed under Kentucky state law see KRS chapter 427.
* Although a state may deny its bankrupts the federal exemption scheme in 11
U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982), a state may not deny its bankrupts a variety of other federal
exemptions, including:
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments, 22 U.S.C. 1104; Social
Security payments, 42 U.S.C. 407; Injury or Death compensation payments
from war risk hazards, 42 U.S.C. 1717; Wages of fishermen, seamen and
apprentices, 46 U.S.C. 601; Civil Service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. 729,
2265; Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act death and
disability benefits, 33 U.S.C. 916; Railroad Retirement Act annuities and
pensions, 45 U.S.C. 228(L); Veterans benefits, 45 U.S.C. 352(E); Special
pensions paid to winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, 38 U.S.C.
3101; and Federal homestead lands on debts contracted before issuance of
the patent, 43 U.S.C. 175.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 360, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5787, 6316.
' A state exemption statute is enforceable only to the extent that it is consistent
with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. See note 96 infra and accompanying text.
9 See In re Volk, 26 Bankr. 457, 459 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1983) (applicable state law
determined by debtor's domicile); In re Klein, 10 Bankr. 356, 358 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1981), rev'd mem., 711 F.2d 1067 (1983); In re Lockwood, 6 Bankr. 623, 624 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1980). See also Marine Midland Bank v. Surfbelt, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 728, 729
(W.D. Pa. 1982) (law of forum governs questions of exemption); In re Downing, 148
F. 120, 121 (W.D. Ky. 1905); Phillips v. Phillips, 285 S.E.2d 52, 54 (Ga. App. 1981).
10 28 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
1 See 26 U.S.C. § 408 (1982) (statutory authority for Individual Retirement Ac-
counts). See generally H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4670, 4791 (legislative history and purpose of IRAs).
,2 (a) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of him and his dependents ... (b)
Assets held, payments made, and amounts payable under a stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract, providing
benefits by reason of age, illness, disability, or length of service.
KRS § 427.150(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
'3 See I 1 U.S.C. § 301 historical and revision notes (1982).
Section 301 specifies the manner in which a voluntary bankruptcy case is
commenced. The debtor files a petition under this section under the par-
ticular operative chapter of the bankruptcy code under which he wishes to
proceed. The filing of the petition constitutes an order for relief in the
case under that chapter.
Id. quoting (S. REP. No. 95-989).
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Code.' 4 "Pursuant to that petition, on Schedule B-415 the debtor
claimed as exempt the cash surrender value of [the]... Individ-
ual Retirement Account pursuant to KRS 427.150 in the amount
of $5,959.68."16 The trustee 7 objected to the exemption. 18 Since
KRS section 427.150 does not expressly mention IRAs, inclusion
or exclusion of such property is a matter of interpretation.19 The
court properly noted that decisions of other jurisdictions were
not controlling and that the resolution of the issue was confined
to state law. 20 However, the court erroneously concluded through
use of a two-part test2' that an IRA was a "similar plan or
contract"' ' to a "stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, [or] an-
nuity," ' 3 and therefore was exempt property.
24
1" See I1 U.S.C. §§ 704-66 (1982) (Chapter 7 covers liquidation under the Bank-
ruptcy Act).
1- Schedule B4 includes "property claimed as exempt" by the bankrupt and is a
part of FoRM No. 6, which the bankrupt is required to file. See 11 U.S.C. app., rule
108(a) (1982); 11 U.S.C. app., FoRM No. 6 ScHEDuLEs (1982).
16 In re Worthington, 28 Bankr. at 737.
'7 The trustee is charged with responsibility for "examin[ing] proofs of claims and
object[ing] to the allowance of any claim that is improper." 11 U.S.C. § 704(4) (1982).
The trustee is also obligated, "if advisable, [to] oppose the discharge of the debtor."
11 U.S.C. § 704(5) (1982).
1" 28 Bankr. at 737.
'9 See Teel v. Am. Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 343 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
("When a federal court is faced with a lack of controlling state judicial authority,
[concerning interpretation of a state statute,] it must determine the law as the state court
would determine it, guided by reason and sound judicial arnalysis."); In re Kanter, 345
F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (D.C. Cal. 1972) ("The bankruptcy court has the power to construe
state statutes, even exemption statutes, where there are no state decisions construing the
same, or where there are conflicting cases."), affd, 505 F.2d 228 (1974). See also
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); Holler v. United States,
724 F.2d 104, 105 (10th Cir. 1983); Reid v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 718 F.2d 677, 680
(4th Cir. 1983); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th
Cir. 1983); Cole v. Cardoze, 441 F.2d 1337, 1343 (6th Cir. 1971); Loengard v. Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 1355, 1358 (D. Colo. 1962); In re William Duncan & Son,
165 F. Supp. 159, 162 (N.D. Cal. 1958); In re Design Craft, Inc., 26 B.R. 469, 475
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Mistura, Inc., 22 B.R. 60, 62 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982);
In re Sexton, 16 B.R. 240, 242 (Bankr. D. Tenn. 1981). But see, e.g., Roberts v. W.-S.
Life Ins. Co., 568 F. Supp. 536, 537 (N.D. Il. 1983) ("Federal court in construing state
law should not attempt dramatic innovation in state law."); In re Griffin, 225 F. Supp.
482, 484 (W.D.N.C. 1963).
-' 28 Bankr. at 738. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
21 28 Bankr. at 738. For the text of this two-part test see text accompanying notes
97, 101 infra.
See 28 Bankr. at 739 ("Parallel in nature [so] as to serve the same goals or
purposes.").
" Id. The Worthington court declined to define these programs, except to say:
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This Comment contends that the court's analysis of the
"nature" of IRA assets was superficial and resulted in the
creation of an exemption not intended 25 by KRS section
427.150(1)(b). The court's interpretation of KRS section
427.150(1)(b) and the court's two-part test fail to advance the
Congressional26 purposes27 of the Bankruptcy Act and its exemp-
tions.
21
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT OF 1978 AND ExEMPTioNs
In enacting the Bankruptcy Act Congress sought to include
all of the debtor's property in the estate and to aid the trustee
in recovering any property that the debtor may have transferred
prior to filing. 29 In Segal v. Rochelle,3 0 the United States Supreme
Court noted that bankruptcy legislation seeks to serve two com-
peting interests. 3' The Bankruptcy Act attempts both to "secure
for creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in
"Each of the specifics named as well as the IRA program has the common theme
of deferred tax liability on assets presently owned, and with the ostensible purpose
to supplement retirement income in the future or provide benefits by reason of age,
illness, disability, or death." Id.
See 28 Bankr. at 739.
21 See notes 79, 88 infra. Cf. In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621, 623 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1982) ("Although exemption laws are to be construed liberally in favor of the
debtor, the court is not at liberty to create exemptions which do not exist.").
26 See In re Balgemann wherein the court noted:
Congress may ... delegate its legislative authority, but in so doing it must
provide guidelines to insure that Congress's objectives are met .... Con-
gress has treated the subject matter of exemptions in a detailed and com-
prehensive manner in § 522 of the Code. The framework and principles of
that section are those Congress intended that the States use when acting
under the authority delegated to them.
In re Balgemann, 16 Bankr. 780, 782 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1982) (citing National Cable
Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); In re Rhodes, 14 Bankr. 629, 631 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983).
27 Cf. In re Steele, 26 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). This earlier opinion,
by the same judge who later decided In re Worthington, recognized that achievement of
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code was the ultimate end to which the "equitable and
legal powers of the Bankruptcy Court" were to be used. See id. at 235.
* For a discussion of the goals and purpose of exemptions, see text accompanying
notes 39-41, 98-99 infra.
See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4, at 5791.
382 U.S. 375 (1966).
" See id. at 379.
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alienable or leviable form32 when he files his petition, ' 33 and
"to leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to
accumulate new wealth in the future."
'34
To accomplish such competing ends the Segal Court's con-
struction of "property ' 35 and the Bankruptcy Act itself must be
viewed as interrelated. 36 In Segal, the Court noted that the term
"property", as employed by the Bankruptcy Act, is to be broadly
construed so as to include even property interests that are "novel
or contingent. ' 37 The practical effect of this ruling is to place
into the estate almost everything to which the debtor has any
claim. 38 Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Act limits this "all inclu-
sive approach" by permitting the bankrupt to exempt certain
property from his estate 9 and hence from the reach of his
creditors. The goals in granting exemptions are:
(1) protecting the individual and his family from poverty,
(2) assisting and encouraging the rehabilitation and "fresh
start" of the debtor,40 and
11 See D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 343 (2d ed. 1978) ("The
general right of the trustee is to property which the bankrupt might have transferred or
which might have been reached by legal process by his creditors .... [L]eviability is
decided by the law of the state in which the property is located." (emphasis and footnote
omitted)).
" 382 U.S. at 379.
'Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 541 for the definition of property and for a specification of
which property is to be estate property.
'6 See 382 U.S. at 379-81.
See id. at 379.
See In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. 621, 622 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); S. REP. No.
989, supra note 4, at 5868.
11 Section 522 permits a debtor to exempt property "notwithstanding section 541."
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b). "All property within the contemplation of Section 541 comes
into the estate, and the property the debtor claims as exempt leaves the estate only after
he properly files his request for exemptions." In re Lowe, 25 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1982). See also notes 5-6 supra. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1982) (spendthrift
trusts, enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, are excluded from the estate);
In re Holt, 32 Bankr. 767, 769 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) ("The congressional intent
underlying the enactment of Code 541(c)(2) was to exclude spendthrift trust property
... of the debtor's estate to the extent the restrictions in the trust are enforceable under
nonbankruptcy law.") (footnote omitted). See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at
6323-25 for the legislative history and purpose of § 541.
, See generally Comment, Protection of a Debtor's "Fresh Start" Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 843 (1979-80).
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(3) shifting of the burden of the social welfare of the debtor
and his family from society as a whole to the creditors who
dealt with the debtor and who contributed to his economic
demise.
4
Yet, as legislative history points out, "the policy of the
bankruptcy law is to provide a fresh start, but not instant
affluence. ' '42 Consequently, section 522(b)(2)(A) 43 gives state leg-
islatures the option to create particular exemptions which will
best allow the debtors of their state to make a "fresh start"
without granting to them an unneeded accession to wealth."
KRS section 427.150(1)(b) evolved from such a framework.
II. AN IRA Is NOT A "SIMLAR PLAN OR CONTRACT"
UNDER KRS SECTION 427.150(l)(b)
The Kentucky exemption provision, KRS section
427.150(l)(b), provides that "(1) An individual is entitled to
exemption of the following property . . . (b) ... stock bonus,
pension, profit-sharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract
... ."45 The provision does not specifically mention IRAs, thus
the question arises whether an IRA is a "plan or contract"
similar to a "stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, [or] annu-
ity." 46
1, See Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 1945), which states:
Bankruptcy statutes are no longer used primarily to punish an insolvent,
but more often to release and rehabilitate him. In the United States public
policy has looked beyond the debtor to his family, when he has one, and
has regarded the reasonable protection of the family as of greater concern
.than the full payment of debts.
See also 9 Am. JuR. 2D Bankruptcy § 302 (1980) ("Exercise and Determination of
Debtor's Exemptions").
41 S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4, at 5792.
" 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1982) provides:
Notwithstanding section 541 of this title, an individual debtor may exempt
from property of the estate ... any property that is exempt under Federal
law, other than subsection (d) .... or State or local law that is applicable
on the date of the filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor's
domicile has been located for the 180 days immediately preceding the date
of the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such 180-day period
than in any other place. ...
See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4.
KRS § 427.150(b)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
46 See In re Worthington, 28 Bankr. 736, 739 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
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The Worthington court stated that "deferred tax liability"
and "supplemental retirement income" were "common themes"
of both IRAs and those plans specifically exempted by KRS
section 427.150(1)(b).47 However, a closer examination of IRAs
and the specifically exempted plans will reveal that these "com-
mon themes" are superficial and that the assets are distinguish-
able. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Kokoszka v.
Belford:4 8 "[The crucial analytical key, [isl not in an abstract
articulation of the statute's purpose, but in an analysis of the
nature of the asset involved in light of those principles.
' 4 9
Certainly, all of the assets being discussed share the notion
of "deferred tax liability" .5 Congress, however, did not create
a pension-like system for IRAs.Y Initially, Congress granted a
tax break only to those employer established retirement plans
that complied with stringent congressional requirements.52 Con-
gress reasoned that such a tax break would be incentive for
employers to establish these "qualified plans" for their employ-
ees, thereby serving the socially desirable end of benefiting the
national retirement system.53 This legislation resulted in a dis-
parity of retirement benefits between employees with access to
qualified plans and those without access.54 Consequently, Con-
,7 See id. at 739.
" 417 U.S. 642 (1974).
" Id. at 646. The Segal court's broad interpretation of "property" has been
incorporated into § 541 of the Bankruptcy Act. See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4, at
5868.
, See I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(1), 408(d)(1) (1984) (neither qualified plans under § 401(a)
nor IRAs are subject to taxation until future distribution).
See In re Mace, 4 BANKR. Cr. DEc. (CRR) 94, 95 (D. Or. 1978).
See id.
Employers who set up qualified plans which serve socially desirable ends, as
determined by Congress, consequently receive favorable tax treatment:
The committee bill ... continues the approach in present law of encour-
aging the establishment of retirement plans which contain socially desirable
provisions through the granting of tax inducements. In other words, ...
no one is compelled to establish a retirement plan. However, if a retirement
plan is to qualify for the favorable tax treatment, it will be required to
comply with specified ... requirements which are designed to improve the
retirement system.
H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 11, at 4677.
" See H.R. REP. No. 807, supra note 1I, at 4791 which states:
General reasons for change
While in the case of many millions of employees, provision is made
for their retirement out of tax-free dollars by their participation in qualified
11331984-1985]
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gress created IRAs to provide equal tax treatment for employees
ineligible to participate in qualified plans." One court dealing
with this issue noted, "[T]here has been no establishment of a
pension system for IRAs but merely an amendment of the In-
ternal Revenue Code to provide certain tax benefits for a dis-
advantaged group to encourage retirement savings. ' '5 6
Furthermore, IRAs and stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing,
and annuity plans are regulated by different Internal Revenue
Code sections.1
7
The assets examined in this case are vastly different in na-
ture.5 8 It is difficult to conclude that Congress, in establishing
IRAs, sought to treat them in all respects similar to the other
qualified plans.5 9 Moreover, to hold that an IRA is "similar"
to the other assets in providing "supplemental retirement in-
come" is to fall victim to the theoretical niceties of its name,
while ignoring the realities of its nature. 60 In granting an exempt
retirement plans, many other employees do not have the opportunity to
participate in qualified plans. . . .Employees who are not covered under
a qualified plan are disadvantaged by the fact that earnings on their
retirement savings are subject to tax, and grow more slowly than the tax-
sheltered earnings on contributions to a qualified plan.
[The proposed IRA legislation] deals with this problem by making
available a special deduction for amounts set aside for retirement by
employees who are not covered under a qualified plan .... The earnings
on this amount will also be tax-free .... [Tihe amounts set aside plus the
earnings are to become taxable to the individual generally after he has
reached retirement age, when he receives benefits from the account.
See also In re Mace, 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 95.
11 "[Flor the first time ... individuals who are not covered by any qualified
pension plan may take a tax deduction for contribution to an individual retirement
plan." In re Mace, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 95. See also note 54 supra.
16 In re Mace, 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 95-96. See also In re Howerton, 21
Bankr. at 623.
11 See I.R.C. § 401 (qualified pension, profit-sharing, and stock bonus plans);
I.R.C. §§ 403, 404 (annuities); I.R.C. § 408 (IRAs).
" See In re Mace, 4 BANKR. CT. DEc. (CRR) at 95.
19 See notes 55-58 supra. See generally 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs 5177,
5189 (statement introducing the Conference report containing the provision for IRAs
does not mention exemption under the Bankruptcy Act).
, Cf. In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. at 623-24:
This court cannot ignore the real nature of the Debtors' I.R.A.s. They are
basically tax deferment plans over which the Debtors exercise a great deal
of control. They may withdraw the cash ... subject to a tax assessment
at anytime and there is no guarantee the funds will be retained until
retirement. If the Debtors have the unlimited capacity to reach those funds,
so does the trustee.
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status to a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plan,
Congress or a state legislature can, with a high degree of cer-
tainty, say such assets will become accessible to the individual
only upon his retirement. 6' Based on this "certainty" such assets
represent bona fide sources of "supplemental retirement in-
come. ' 62 In the case of IRAs, not only is there no guarantee
the individual will leave the asset untouched until retirement,
63
there is likewise little to deter liquidation of such an asset.f
4
The most important distinction between an IRA and a stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plan is the control that
the individual retains over the asset .6 Although the Worthington
court sidestepped this issue, 66 the control element is crucial to
an analysis of the nature of the asset based on the purposes of
bankruptcy law. 67 The Worthington court said an IRA will func-
1' See note 62 infra and accompanying text.
6-' See 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 96-97 ("In each of the ... cases where the
asset was determined to be a substitute for future wages, the bankrupt had only limited
control over the fund so that there was a substantial certainty that the funds would be
used at a time when a wage substitute was necessary.").
61 See In re Shackelford, 27 Bankr. 372, 373 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983); In re Lowe,
25 Bankr. 86, 88 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. at 623; In re Talbert,
15 Bankr. 536, 537 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981); 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 95.
m See 27 Bankr. at 373 (An IRA "may be revoked by the Debtor at any time,
subject only to the penalty set forth in the Internal Revenue Code."); In re Blatter, 16
Bankr. 137, 138 n.l (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("IIRA] is a self-settled trust not exempt
from a judgment creditor's execution levy. . . . [I]t is of no consequence that an
involuntary premature withdrawal of funds will result in tax penalties and onerous tax
consequences to the debtor in addition to loss of the fund itself."). Also, see note 72
infra for the relevant portion of the I.R.C. section regarding penalty.
61 See In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. at 623; 15 Bankr. at 537 (An IRA can be
distinguished from an annuity and pension based on the amount of control the depositor
has over the funds.); In re Mace, 4 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) at 96-97. See also In re
Clark, 18 Bankr. 824, 827-28 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (Keogh plan not exempt where
debtor retained option to receive assets in a lump-sum payment and trust allowed
distribution of the trust assets prior to the debtor attaining age 59-1/2); In re Watson,
13 Bankr. 391, 391 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (Debtor's interest in qualified plan where
debtor had present right to terminate plan and withdraw funds was not exempt); In re
Baviello, 12 Bankr. 412, 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Keogh account not exempt where
debtor had complete control over the account at all times). Accord In re Parker, 473 F.
Supp. 746, 751-52 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (fund exempt from estate where limitations on
bankrupt's control effectively precluded use of fund for any purpose other than future
support of bankrupt and his dependents).
I See 28 Bankr. at 739 ("Debtor control over assets is not the determinant of
whether exempt status exists.").
6" See, e.g., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CCR) at 96 (recognizing the "nature of the
asset" test set out in Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. at 642, the court noted the high
level of control a debtor has over an IRA differentiates it from a pension and makes it
not exempt). See also cases cited supra note 65.
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tion as a substitute for wages during retirement. 63 Although this
is ostensibly true, other courts considering the specific issue of
whether IRAs are exempt property have noted that there is no
certainty that such a function will be served.69 With a stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing or annuity plan, an individual has
very restricted access to the funds prior to retirement. 70 Typi-
cally, an individual would have to quit his job to receive such
funds .7 In contrast, the owner of an IRA is free at any time to
withdraw the funds subject only to a ten percent tax penalty.72
Moreover, in the case of a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing
or annuity plan, an employer-employee relationship is contem-
plated where each party has an equal say in the management of
the fund. An IRA creates a depositor-depositary relationship in
which the depositary is merely an agent of the depositor and
legally obligated to act according to the depositor's directions.
Moreover, although a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing or
annuity plan is severely limited with regard to assignability and
alienation, 74 IRAs are not so limited .75 Absent stringent limiting
See 28 Bankr. at 739.
See In re Shackelford, 27 Bankr. at 373; In re Lowe, 25 Bankr. at 88; In re
Howerton, 21 Bankr. at 623; In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. at 537; In re Mace, 4 BANKR.
CT. DEC. (CCR) at 96-97. See also In re Ferwerda, 424 F.2d 1131, 1133 (7th Cir. 1970);
In re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305, 312 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 726 F.2d 126S
(1984); In re Hinshaw, 23 Bankr. 233, 235-36 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); In re Baviello, 12
Bankr. 412, 415 (Keogh account not exempt).
' See 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 95.
See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
[In] the usual case of employer-created funds ... the beneficiary employee
has little or no control during the term of his employment, and may only
withdraw funds upon termination of employment. He must quit his job in
order to gain premature access to his retirement funds. We cannot equate
a "tax penalty" with "employment termination" as equal restraints upon
withdrawal of pension funds.
Id. at 589 (footnote omitted).
'z I.R.C. § 408(0(1) (1984) provides:
If a distribution from an individual retirement account.., to the individual
for whose benefit such account . . . was established is made before such
individual attains age 59-1/2, his tax under this chapter for the taxable
year in which such distribution is received shall be increased by an amount
equal to 10 percent of the amount of the distribution which is includible
in his gross income for such taxable year.
,3 See 15 Bankr. at 538.
See I.R.C. § 401(a)(13) (1984): "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust
under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that benefits
provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-
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provisions, the potential for removal of funds from the IRA for
uses other than retirement greatly increases.
76
Another distinction between IRAs and a stock bonus, pen-
sion, profit-sharing or annuity plan is the control of the disbursal
of the funds. This distinction appears in both the form and
timing of disbursement, and is best seen on an asset to asset
comparison. Annuities may only be distributed in installment
payments, 77 while the owner of an IRA may elect to receive a
lump-sum payment. 78 Funds from a pension plan may be dis-
tributed only during retirement, 79 but an IRA permits an indi-
vidual to withdraw the funds while gainfully employed. 80 Profit-
sharing and stock bonus plan funds, like IRAs, may be disbursed
in either installments or lump-sums, 8' however, the provisions of
the plan determine the timing of such disbursements.8 2 In con-
trast, the owner of an IRA has sole control over the timing of
disbursement, subject to a penalty for early withdrawal.83 Such
distinctions make it difficult to conclude that an IRA is a bona
fide source of retirement income or a substitute for future wages.
Finally, some courts have denied IRAs exempt status because
an IRA is an "account" and not a policy or plan.84 These
authorities conclude that the federal tax break given to a savings
account established for retirement does not imply that such an
account is exempt from the bankrupt's estate. 85
13 (1984) for the specific scope of the assignment or alienation requirement. See also 4
BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 95.
7 See I.R.C. § 408(e)(4)(f)(2) (1982) (use of IRA as security for a loan only
subjects portion designated as security to treatment as if distributed-tax plus 10%
penalty tax imposed); In re Mace, BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 95.
See 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) at 97.
S. GOLDBERG, PENSION PLANS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATON § 2.17 (1974). See
In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. at 537.
" In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. at 537.
" S. GOLDBERG, supra note 77, at § 2.17. See also In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024,
1026 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[P]ension payments . .. are periodic payments made during a
time when the pensioner may well have none or few other sources of income.").
' See text accompanying note 72 supra.
" S. GOLDBERG, supra note 77, at § 2.17.
Id. at 4.
" See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
See, e.g., In re Talbert, 15 Bankr. at 537; In re Mace, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CCR) at 97.
1 See 15 Bankr. at 537.
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Public policy favoring the prevention of fraudulent transac-
tions also demands non-exempt status for IRAs.8 6 The Worthing-
ton court noted that, absent intent to defraud, exemptions should
be liberally construed in favor of the debtor.8 7 However, the
United States Supreme Court noted in Kokoszka-without men-
tioning the debtor's intent-that the "nature" of the asset is the
key to determining whether an asset is exempt.88 A liberal con-
struction does not mean the court is free to exercise creativity.
89
If granted an exempt status, IRAs would be highly susceptible
to transfers of funds by debtors seeking to evade their creditors. 90
Granting an IRA exempt status could effectively moot the issue
of fraud, 9' thereby eroding the Worthington court's reliance on
the absence of such intent. 92
Viewed in light of the purposes and principles of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 93 the "nature" of an IRA is hardly a "similar plan
6 See In re Shackelford, 27 Bankr. at 373 ("[To exempt this property would give
[Debtor] a license to convert non-exempt cash to an exempt savings account on the eve
of bankruptcy."); 15 Bankr. at 538. See also note 90 infra.
See In re Worthington, 28 Bankr. at 739 (citing Doethlaff v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1941)) ("There is no evidence to indicate that the
establishment of the IRA was with intent to delay, hinder, or defraud creditors of the
payments made thereunder, and absent such intent, express or implied, the exemption
statute is entitled to a construction liberal to the debtors."), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 579
(1940).
88 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. at 646. The Court's language is quoted in text
accompanying note 49 supra.
19 See In re Howerton, 21 Bankr. at 623. Cf. In re Potter, 4 F.2d 807, 807 (S.D.
Fla. 1924) ("While the law allowing exemptions to the debtor will be liberally construed
in his favor, yet the burden of proving that the property contained in the claim comes
within the exemptions of the law rests upon the bankrupt.").
Before declaring bankruptcy, a debtor could transfer funds from a conventional
savings account into an IRA. Since an IRA would have an exempt status, the debtor
could withdraw those funds at any time, subject only to a 10% tax penalty. See 15 B.R.
at 538; 4 BANKR. CT. Dac. (CRR) at 97.
91 Compare S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4, at 5862 ("[Tlhe debtor will be permitted
to convert nonexempt property before filing a banjtruptcy petition. This practice is not
fraudulent as to creditors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions
to which he is entitled under the law.") with In re White, 28 Bankr. 240, 243 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1983) ("Although courts agree that a debtor's conversion of his nonexempt
property into exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy is not fraudulent per se, they
conclude that extrinsic circumstances may indicate the commission of a fraud on a
debtor's creditors.") and In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 683, 688 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981)
("Where fraud on creditors is concerned, the practice of converting nonexempt property
to exempt property ... is denounced").
92 See note 87 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 29-34 supra for a discussion of the purposes of
the Bankruptcy Act.
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or contract" to a "stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, [or]
annuity". A state, by exercising its prerogative to "opt out" of
the federal exemption scheme in section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy
Act, does not also "opt out" of the other provisions of section
522.94 Moreover, a state can refuse to apply the exemptions of
section 522(d), 9s but it cannot ignore or attempt to undermine
the principles and purposes of the Bankruptcy Act itself.
96
III. THE PROPER TEST FOR EXEMPTION
UNDER KRS SECTION 427.150(1)(b)
The Worthington court determined that an asset must satisfy
a two-part test to fall under the purview of KRS section
427.150(1)(b). Like the rest of the court's analysis of the issue,
this test was overly narrow and failed to comport with the
guiding principles of the Bankruptcy Act.
The first part of the court's test was: "Is the cash value of
the IRA account reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor and his dependents in addition to property otherwise
totally exempt?" 97 The purpose of bankruptcy law and exemp-
tions is not to provide immediate support, but to provide suf-
ficient assets to enable the debtor to make a fresh start in
accumulating post-bankruptcy wealth for future support. 98 Ex-
See In re Morgan, 15 Bankr. 620, 621 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d
471 (1982); In re Hill, 4 Bankr. 310, 313-14 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). See also note 26
supra.
ua See, e.g., In re Lee, 22 Bankr. 977, 979 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1982) ("Section 522
(b)(1) allows a state the opportunity to decline to authorize the federal exemption scheme
and adopt its own list of allowable exemptions.").
96 See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 705 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
427 (1983); In re Locarno, 23 B.R. 622, 631 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982) ("[Sltate bankruptcy
laws are invalid ... to the extent that they actually conflict with bankruptcy legislation
enacted by Congress."); In re Lee, 22 Bankr. at 979 ("The intention of Congress was
not to create in the states the power to make the bankruptcy laws for its residents. The
intention was solely to allow the states to 'not authorize' the use of § 522(d) exemptions
for all of that state's residents.") (citations omitted); In re Storer, 13 Bankr. 1, 3 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1980) ("[N]o state can pass a law to be effective in bankruptcy to deprive a
debtor of [a] ... right ... authorized by the Bankruptcy Code.").
91 In re Worthington, 28 Bankr. 736, 738 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
In re Hahn, 5 Bankr. 242 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1980). The Hahn court noted that:
[tihere are five basic purposes for exemption laws:
1. To provide a debtor enough money to survive.
2. To protect his dignity and his cultural and religious identity.
3. To afford a means of financial rehabilitation.
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emptions are allowed for the benefit and support of dependents,
not the debtor.99 The proper test is whether the cash value of
the IRA account is reasonably necessary to allow the debtor to
accumulate post-bankruptcy wealth for the future support of
dependents. Given the high susceptibility of IRAs to fraudulent
practices,' °° the close examination of the facts that such a test
would demand would be justifiable.
The second part of the test was: "Is an IRA account a
'similar plan or contract' under the provisions of KRS
427.150(1)(b)?"'' The Supreme Court noted in Kokoszka that
the nature of the asset should be judged in light of the principles
of the Bankruptcy Act.'0 2 A better test is whether an IRA ac-
count is a similar plan or contract to those mentioned in KRS
section 427.150(1)(b) when the "nature" of all the assets in
question are examined in light of the purposes and principles of
exemptions as provided by the Bankruptcy Act. The correct
answer is a resounding no.'03
CONCLUSION
The Kentucky courts in determining whether an asset is
exempt under KRS section 427.150(l)(b) should evaluate the
nature of the asset in light of the principles of the Bankruptcy
Act. Bankruptcy law seeks not only to satisfy claims of creditors,
but also to leave the debtor ample assets with which to make a
"fresh start." Bankruptcy law, however, does not seek to pro-
4. To protect the family unit from impoverishment.
5. To spread the burden of the debtor's support from society to his
creditors.
Id. at 244. See also notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text. But cf. In re Swartz, 18
Bankr. 454, 456 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (exemptions are not intended for abuse); In re
Kochell, 26 Bankr. 86, 87 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) ("[Tlhe purpose of ... exemptions
is to protect the fresh start of the debtor following bankruptcy, not to insure that no
future misfortune could possibly lower the standard of living to which the debtor's
dependents have become accustomed.").
See In re Swartz, 18 Bankr. at 456 ("The purpose of an exemption under the
Bankruptcy Code is not for the personal privilege of the debtor, but for the benefit of
[the debtor's] family who may be destitute and the public who might otherwise be
burdened with the support of an insolvent debtor's family.").
" See notes 90, 91 supra.
See 28 Bankr. at 738.
'o See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 646 (1974).
'°' See S. REP. No. 989, supra note 4, at 5792.
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vide instant affluence. The Worthington court's decision to treat
IRAs as similar to traditionally exempt stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing or annuity plans established precedent that under-
mines such ends.
The court's decision makes it possible for a shrewd debtor
to deposit funds in an IRA, file bankruptcy, and immediately
have complete access to such funds free from claims by credi-
tors. °0 Considering that any pre-bankruptcy debt has been sat-
isfied in accordance with bankruptcy proceedings, this post-
bankruptcy fund represents a windfall to the debtor which is
unattainable under the traditional retirement plans provided for
by KRS section 427.150(1)(b). 
0 5
Other courts have recognized the disparity between the true
"nature" of an IRA when compared to a stock bonus, pension,
profit-sharing or annuity plan. The bankruptcy courts in Ken-
tucky should take note of such distinctions and promptly reverse
the Worthington precedent.
Kevin Charles Dicken
' See note 90 supra.
,o See text accompanying notes 60-76 supra.
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